UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-8-2016

Davis v. Davis Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 43852

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Davis v. Davis Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 43852" (2016). Not Reported. 3045.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3045

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 43852

CORI LYNN DAVIS,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
V

ROCKY DEAN DA VIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Bannock County.
Honorable Steven A. Thomsen, Magistrate Judge presiding.
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Bannock County
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn, District Court Judge presiding.

Ryan L. Holdaway, ISB #8289
Diane Pitcher, ISB #8340
PITCHER & HOLDAWAY, PLLC
40 W. Cache Valley Blvd. Ste., 3B
Logan, UT 8434 l
Telephone: (435) 787-1200
Facsimile: (855) 787-1200
Email: office@pitcherholdaway.com
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

Patrick N. George
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE &
BAILEY, CHTD.
PO Box 1391 Center Plaza
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391
Telephone: (208) 232-6101
Facsimile: (208) 232-6109
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
Angela Jen sen
Guardian Ad Litem
150 S. Arthur Ave., Ste. 201
PO Box 1785
Pocatello, ID 83204
Telephone: (208) 241-7241
Facsimile: (208) 233-2421
Attorney for minor child, K.D.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Argument in Reply..........................................................................................................

1-6

A. The Issue is Not Moot as Mr. Davis is Susceptible to the Sarne
Harm Happening to Hirn and Relating to the Sarne Issue...............................................

1-4

B. The appeal is Not Frivilous or Brought in Bad Faith as it is Presents

an Exception to the Mootness Doctrine and Properly Asks this Court to
Consider Whether a Judge Abused his Discretion..........................................................

5-6

Conclusion.......................................................................................................................

6-7

11

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734 (2012)..................................................................

1

Cowan v. Bd. Comm'rs, 413 Idaho 501 (2006)....................................................................

1

Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).........................................................................

2

Ellibee v. Ellibee, 121 Idaho 501 (1992).............................................................................

1

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000).........

3

Hernandez v. Phillips, 141 Idaho 779 (2005)......................................................................

6

Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969)................................................................................

2

Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710 (2007)..............................................................................

5

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).......................................................................................

1-4

Roeh v. Roeh, 113 Idaho 557 (Ct. App. l 987).....................................................................

5

Russell v. v. Fortney, 111 Idaho 181 (Ct. App. 1986).........................................................

4

Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859 (2008).............................................................................

5

Rules:

Idaho Appellate Rule 13......................................................................................................

4

Idaho Rule Civil Procedure 81...... .......................... .............................................................

4

lll

ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The Respondent makes three contentions in her responding brief: 1) that the present issue
is moot; 2) that the facts support the district court's findings and ruling; and 3) the appeal is
frivolous and therefore the Respondent is entitled to attorney's fees and costs. See generally,
Respondent's Brief (June 9, 2016)(hereinafter "RB"). Issue one and three will be addressed here.
As issue two is primarily addressed by the Appellant's Opening Brief, that issue will not be
addressed here.

A. THE ISSUE IS NOT MOOT AS MR. DAVIS IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE SAME
HARM HAPPENING TO HIM AND RELATING TO THE SAME ISSUE.
The Respondent correctly cites to the general rule of mootness. RB at 19 (citing
Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 739 (2012)). That general rule being that a "case is

moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no practical
effect upon the outcome." Cowan v. Bd. Comm 'rs, 143 Idaho 501, 509 (2006). The Respondent
later acknowledges one exception to the general rule, which is tha public interest exception. RB
at 21 (citing Ellibee v. Ellibee, 121 Idaho 501, 503 (1992)). However, the Respondent stops short
of recognizing or discussing any other exceptions to the general rule regarding mootness. See RB
at 19-23. One such exception being the possibility of the same harm being committed against the
same party on a matter evading appeal. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 123-25 (1973).
In Roe the respondent argued the appeal was moot because the appellant's pregnancy had
concluded and hence the issue was moot. Id. at 123-24. In so arguing, the respondent in Roe, as
the Respondent in the present matter, contended that since the harm has passed, under the
general rule of mootness the case should not be heard. Id. However, the U.S. Supreme Court
considered the fact that "[p ]regnancy often comes more than once to the same woman, and in the
general population, if man is to survive, it will always be with us." Id. Furthermore, due to the
1

nature of pregnancy, the life of the pregnancy was not likely to survive the time necessary to
appeal. Id. Accordingly, the court in Roe concluded that the law ought not to be "so rigid" as to
effectively deny review to those who are harmed but would normally be denied appellate review
under the general rule of mootness. Id. Accordingly, it applied an exception to the general rule
permitting appeals to move forward, even where technically moot, where the same harm could
befall the same party, as the underlying issue evaded review. Id.
Similarly in Moore v. Ogilvie, the U.S. Supreme Court utilized the same exception where
the appellant was challenging election laws. 394 U.S. 814 (1969). Due to the fact that the law in
question created a harm that ended with the election, the matter was technically moot by the time
it reached review with the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 816. Nevertheless, the court held again that
where a matter presents a problem that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review" the matter
will not be dismissed for mootness even though technically moot. Id.
In contrast, in Defunis v. Odegaard, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to exercise the
exception because the appellant could not possibly incur the same harm as originally complained
of. 416 U.S. 312 (1974). In that case the appellant was challenging the admission process of a
law school. Id. at 317-318. By the time the matter had reached the U.S. Supreme Court, not only
had the appellant been admitted, but he was in his third year as a law student and all parties
agreed he would be able to complete school and receive his degree. Id. In other words, he could
not possibly suffer the same harm again in the admission process and therefore the result was
"definite and concrete." Id. Accordingly, the court did not apply the exception and held his
matter was moot. Id.
Consequently, while Roe and Moore present cases that are inherently difficult to appeal
without issues of mootness arising due to the nature of the harm, the analysis in Defunis suggests
the focus is primarily on the potential of the harm repeating itself against the same party if the
2

appeal is not permitted to go forward. This is in line with another exception to the mootness
doctrine which is the voluntary relinquishment of a harm.
In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, the respondent had
voluntarily ceased its harmful conduct by the time the matter reached the U.S. Supreme Court.
528 U.S. 167 (2000). The cessation of the harmful conduct rendered the appeal technically moot.

Id. at 189-90. However, the court held that were it to treat such matters as moot and decline to
review, "the courts would be compelled to leave 'the defendant ... free to return to his old
ways." Id. This would in turn, leave the appellant to continued exposure to the harm without
hope of long term relief from the courts. Indeed, such was the concern of the court that is held it
was the burden of the party claiming mootness to prove the harm was not likely to recur in the
future. Id. Finally, the court recognized the analogous relationship between this exception and
the exception set forth in Roe as it relied on the principle set forth in Roe as a basis for the
voluntary cessation exception. Id.
Coupled with these rules are the policy and intent behind mootness. The U.S. Supreme
Court has explained that policy, insofar as it applies to the federal courts as relating to the
preservation of scarce judicial resources. Id. at 190-91. However, the court was mindful to note
that in some cases, "by the time mootness is an issue, the case has been brought and litigated,
often (as here) for years. To abandon the case at an advanced stage may prove more wasteful
than frugal." Id. The exceptions delineated in Roe and Friends of the Earth, Inc. exist because it
is recognized that the issue giving rise to the appeal may very well arise again between the same
parties if not resolved now. Consequently, to dismiss the action on mootness does save judicial
resources as it simply invites more litigation when the same harm appears in the future to the
same parties.
The exceptions discussed above, in addition to the policy reasons behind them, denote
3

that the salient point of analysis in mootness is whether the same harm can befall the same party
if the matter evades review. While some matters are inherently likely to evade review (such as
pregnancy related matters), others are less inherent, but expose the party to the same risks and
harm nonetheless. It is this exposure to a renewal of the harm that renders the issue nonmoot.
Idaho family law matters present situations where review may be evaded. Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 8l(i)(2) in tandem with Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(ll) operate to permit judges
to continue to modify orders regarding child support and child custody even while the order
being modified is being appealed. Such was the case here as the order being appealed was
modified following the commencement of the appeal Indeed, the power to modify the order
continues to reside with the magistrate judge even as the appeal continues before this Court. It is
for this reason that the Respondent has been able to maintain her present Motion to Modify
wherein she is seeking the minor child be returned to her as the primary custodial parent. Indeed,
the Respondent is at this very moment attempting to recreate the very harm the Appellant
complains of. This is precisely the very type of matter the well recognized exceptions have been
created to address.
While the Appellant has relied on federal law to explain the exceptions to mootness,
Idaho has recognized the exception set out in Roe. Russell v. Fortney, 111 Idaho 181, 182-83 (Ct.
App. 1986). In doing so, the Idaho Court of Appeals was presumably mindful of the policy
reasons behind the exception and found those reasons acceptable for applicability to questions of
mootness before Idaho courts. Accordingly, it is appropriate for Mr. Davis to pursue his appeal
on the basis that not only is he at risk of the same harm on the same matter, but is threatened by a
repetition of that very harm at the present moment.
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B. THE APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS OR BROUGHT IN BAD FAITH AS IT IS
PRESENTS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE AND PROPERLY
ASKS THIS COURT TO CONSIDER WHETHER A JUDGE ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION.

The Respondent contends she is entitled to her attorney's fees and costs on two grounds.
The first is that the issue is moot and therefore frivolously pursued. The second is that the
Appellant is allegedly merely asking this Court to "second-guess a finder of fact on conflicting
evidence." RB at 32-33. The issue of mootness has been discussed in the previous section and
will not be readdressed here.
The Appellant does not merely ask this Court to re-evaluate evidence, nor does it ask this
Court to weigh and determine which conflicting evidence the magistrate should have believed.
Indeed, when the Respondent states in her brief that "[Mr. Davis] does not dispute the evidence
the court considered relating to him," she is acknowledging that Mr. Davis is not asking this
Court to weigh in on conflicting evidence.
Mr. Davis is very direct on what legal grounds he is asserting as a basis for error in the
magistrate's findings and rulings. Appellant's Opening Brief, 7 (May 9, 2016). Each of the stated
grounds were set forth by either the Idaho Court of Appeals or this Court as appropriate grounds
for reversal. This includes conclusions not supported by sufficient evidence (Nelson v. Nelson,
144 Idaho 710 (2007) ), findings not made on substantial and competent evidence (id.),
overemphasizing one of the best interest factors (Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 863 (2008)),
or relying on stale evidence (Roeh v. Roeh, 113 Idaho 557 (Ct. App. 1987)). Each of those
grounds may result in reversal and each one necessarily requires this Court to consider the facts
as they relate to the ultimate findings and conclusions of the magistrate. Therefore, Mr. Davis's
5

review of the facts is not done purely to invite this Court to second-guess the magistrate's
findings and conclusions as they relate to those facts, but rather to determine if the magistrate's
findings and conclusions remained within the limits of its discretionary powers.
While Mr. Davis believes the magistrate court abused its discretion, he is cognizant that
this Court may ultimately disagree with him and conclude the magistrate remained within its
discretionary limits. However, the test of whether a matter was brought frivolously is not
determined by who loses or who wins. Otherwise, should Mr. Davis prevail one could argue Ms.
Davis defended the appeal frivolously.
The basis of attorney's fees for an alleged frivolous appeal requires that the appeal was
brought "without a reasonable ground in fact or law." Hernandez v. Phillips, 141 Idaho 779, 783
(2005). In stating that rule, this Court acknowledged that where a party does nothing more than
ask this Court to "reconsider the evidence and side with him" then attorney's fees are appropriate.
Id. Inversely, where the appealing party goes beyond the mere re-hashing of the evidence then it

was not frivolous. Of course, the issue becomes a sensitive one when one considers that
questions of abuse of discretion inherently necessitate a review of the facts and magistrate's
determinations around and based on those facts. Consequently, the fact that Mr. Davis asks this
Court to consider the facts at issue is a necessary component of the appeal. It is perhaps for this
reason that this Court has noted that even where the appellant raises legitimate issues, even if
"not with the strongest hoist," then attorney's fees are not appropriate. Id.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Davis stands to suffer the same harm over the same issues and involving the same
parties. To that end he falls within well recognized and well established exceptions to the
mootness doctrine. Additionally, Mr. Davis has brought his appeal in good faith and is seeking
not just a judicial second-guessing of facts, but a review of the magistrates exercise of discretion
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as they relate to those facts. Accordingly, Mr. Davis respectfully requests this Court review his
matter and, based on the arguments set forth in his Opening Brief, find the magistrate court
abused its discretion.
DATED this 5th day of July 2016.

Ryan L. Holdaway
Attorney for Respondent
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